State v. Villavicencio Respondent\u27s Brief Dckt. 42198 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
2-13-2015
State v. Villavicencio Respondent's Brief Dckt.
42198
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"State v. Villavicencio Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42198" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5392.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5392
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) NO. 42198 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) ELMORE COUNTY NO. CR 2005-2654 
~ ) 
) 
JOSE LUIS VILLAVICENCIO, ) RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
) 
Defendant-Respondent. ) ___________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE 
COUNTY OF ELMORE 
HONORABLE LYNN NORTON 
District Judge 
SARA B. THOMAS 
State Appellate Public Defender 
State of Idaho 
I.S.B. #5867 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Chief, Appellate Unit 
I.S.B. #6247 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
I.S.B. #8210 
3050 N. Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100 




KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Law Division 
P .0. Box 83720 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1 
Nature of the Case ..................................................................................... 1 
Statement of the Facts and 
Course of Proceedings ............................................................................... 1 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL .................................................................................. 5 
ARGUMENT ................................................................................................................... 6 
The District Court Correctly Determined That It Lacked Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction To Reformulate Mr. Villavicencio's Period Of Probation .......................... 6 
A. Introduction .............................................................................................. 6 
B. Standard Of Review .............................................................................................. 6 
C. The District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Which Precluded 
It From Reformulating Mr. Villavicencio's Period Of Probation ............................. 7 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 15 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING .......................................................................................... 16 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Fairway Development Co. v. Bannock County, 119 Idaho 121 (1990) ............ 7, 13 
Martin v. Smith, 154 Idaho 161 (2013) .................................................................. 8 
State v. Allen, 144 Idaho 875 (Ct. App. 2007) ...................................................... .4 
State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372 (Ct. App. 2008) ...................................... 11, 13 
State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003) ........................................................... 7, 12 
State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673 (Ct. App. 2013) ............................................... 3, 8 
State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837 (2011) ...................................................................... 7 
State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223 (2004) ....................................................... 6, 7, 11 
Rules 
!.C.R. 11 ........................................................................................................... 2, 6 
I .C.R. 35 ...................................................................................................... passim 
Statutes 
1.C. § 20-222(1) ..................................................................................................... 7 
I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) ....................................................................................... 3, 6, 8 
I.C. 19-2601 ...................................................................................................... 3, 7 
Additional Authorities 
20 AM. JUR.2d Courts§ 70 (1995) ....................................................................... 7 
ii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The State timely appealed from the district court's order granting 
Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct an illegal sentence and the district court's Corrected 
Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation. On appeal, Mr. Villavicencio 
argues that the district court imposed a ten year period of probation when it was only 
statutorily authorized to impose a seven year period of probation. Since this error was 
discovered approximately eight months after Mr. Villavicencio's period of probation 
expired, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case at that time. It 
follows that the district court was required to grant Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct 
an illegal sentence and enter its Corrected Order Suspending Sentence and Order of 
Probation. The State completely ignored the jurisdictional issue, which was raised 
below. Instead, it argues that the district court's error can be overlooked and this matter 
can be remanded for resentencing because there was a legal means to impose a ten 
year period of probation when Mr. Villavicencio was initially placed on probation. The 
State's position is untenable because the district court's lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction functions as an absolute bar to the relief requested by the State. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A police officer responded to a "possible mental subject" at a private residence. 
(R., p.12.) Upon arrival, the police officer contacted Mr. Villavicencio who made some 
incoherent statements and tried to hide what the police officer described as a small 
plastic baggy containing a crystalline substance. (R., pp.12-13.) The police officer 
arrested Mr. Villavicencio and a subsequent field test indicated that the crystalline 
substance was methamphetamine. (R., p.13.) 
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Mr. Villavicencio was charged, by Information, with possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) and possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.25-26.) 
At this time, Mr. Villavicencio had pending charges against him in CR 2004-2777 and 
CR 2005-2259. (R., p.29.) Pursuant to a binding global I.C.R. 11 plea agreement, 
Mr. Villavicencio pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance, in this matter, 
and possession of a controlled substance in CR 2004-2777. (R., pp.29-31.) In return, 
the State dismissed CR 2005-2259. (R., pp.29-31.) The parties also agreed to two 
consecutive unified sentences of five years, with one and one-half years fixed, a period 
of retained jurisdiction (hereinafter, Rider), and, in the event Mr. Villavicencio 
successfully completed his Rider, a "supervised probation for a period of ten ( 10) 
years." (R., p.45.) After accepting the I.C.R. 11 plea agreement, the district court 
imposed two concurrent/consecutive 1 unified sentences of five years, with one and one-
half years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.35, 42.) On March 6, 2006, the 
district court suspended the sentences and placed Mr. Villavicencio on two concurrent 
ten year periods of probation. (R., pp.54-61; Respondent's Brief, p.4.) 
On November 15, 2013, approximately seven years and eight months after 
Mr. Villavicencio was placed on probation, the State filed a motion for warrant for 
probation violation alleging that Mr. Villavicencio violated the terms of his probation. 
(R., pp.131-134.) Mr. Villavicencio filed an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal 
sentence, arguing that his ten year period of probation was illegal because the district 
court could not order a period of probation which exceeded seven years. In support of 
1 According to the minutes of the sentencing hearing, the district court orally 
pronounced that Mr. Villavicencio sentences "are concurrent" (R., p.35; 03/06/06 
Tr., p.10, Ls.13-15), but the written judgment ordered the sentences to run 
consecutively. (R., p.42.) 
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his motion, Mr. Villavicencio pointed out that he pleaded guilty to possession of a 
controlled substance pursuant to I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1 ), which authorized the district court 
to impose a maximum sentence of seven years. (R., p.209.) Mr. Villavicencio then 
argued that I.C. § 19-2601 (7) provides that a period of probation cannot exceed "the 
maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned." (R., p.209.) 
Since the maximum period of probation cannot exceed the maximum sentence the 
district court could impose, the maximum period of probation the district court was 
statutorily authorized to impose was a seven year period of probation. (R., p.209.) 
The State objected to Mr. Villavicencio's illegal sentence motion and asserted 
that the district court mistakenly used the word concurrent when it meant that the 
probationary terms were to be served consecutive to each other. (R., p.216.) The State 
then argued that Mr. Villavicencio waived his ability to file the illegal sentence motion 
because he entered a binding plea agreement and was bound by the agreed ten year 
period of probation. (R., pp.216-218.) Alternatively, the State argued that even if 
Mr. Villavicencio's "rights were violated," the district court should deny his motion based 
on the doctrine of invited error. (R., pp.218-219.) 
Mr. Villavicencio responded to the State's objection, and argued, based on 
State v. Kesling, 155 Idaho 673 (Ct. App. 2013), that the district court lost subject matter 
jurisdiction over this case on March 6, 2013, because the State filed its motion to revoke 
probation after the expiration of the statutorily authorized seven year period of 
probation. (R., pp.240-242.) Mr. Villavicencio then argued that the terms of the plea 
agreement were irrelevant because the only action the district court could take was to 
dismiss this proceeding for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (R., pp.240-242.) 
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A hearing was held on the motion, and the State argued that the district court 
could have legally imposed a ten year period of probation by ordering two consecutive 
five year periods of probation in each case. (05/05/14 Tr., p.3, L.19 - p.4, L.9.) The 
district court2 ruled that it orally pronounced two concurrent ten year periods of 
probation, which was also reflected in the written order. (05/05/14 Tr., p.6, L.17 - p.7, 
L.19.) The district court implicitly ruled, based on Kesling, that Mr. Villavicencio's 
statutorily authorized period of probation expired on March 6, 2013, which was 
approximately eight months before the State filed its motion to revoke probation. 
(05/05/14 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.2.) The district court then ruled, based on State v. Allen, 
144 Idaho 875 (Ct. App. 2007), that it was bound by the period of probation which was 
originally pronounced at the rider review hearing and it had no authority to enter an 
amended judgment which would correct appeared to be a mistake, i.e. the two ten 
concurrent ten year periods of probation. (05/05/14 Tr., p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.19.) The 
district court granted Mr. Villavicencio's I.C.R. 35(a) motion and entered a Corrected 
Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation, which ordered Mr. Villavicencio to 
serve a seven year period of probation which expired at midnight on March 5, 2013. 
(R., pp.249-259.) Mr. Villavicencio timely appealed. (R., pp.262-264.) 
2 Judge Wetherell presided over the rider review hearing (R., p.54), and Judge Norton 
presided over the hearing on Mr. Villavicencio's illegal sentence motion. (R., p.248.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court correctly determine that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to 
reformulate Mr. Villavicencio's period of probation? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Correctly Determined That It Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction To 
Reformulate Mr. Villavicencio's Period Of Probation 
A Introduction 
Mr. Villavicencio argues that the district court correctly granted his motion to 
correct an illegal sentence because his ten year period of probation was illegal, as the 
maximum period of probation which can be ordered for a violation of I.C. § 37-
2732(c)(1) is seven years. The State argues that the plea agreement was for a ten year 
period of probation and that the district court could have legally structured this period of 
probation by ordering two consecutive five year periods of probation in this case and in 
CR 2004-777. The State then requests that this case be remanded for resentencing 
"consistent with the parties' binding Rule 11 plea agreement." Contrary fo the State's 
position, the district court lost subject matter jurisdiction over this case on March 6, 
2013, and, therefore, has no legal authority to restructure Mr. Villavicencio's period of 
probation. As such, the district court did not err when it granted Mr. Villavicencio's 
motion to correct an illegal sentence and entered its Corrected Order Suspending 
Sentence and Order of Probation. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Subject matter jurisdiction "may be raised at any time, including for the first time 
on appeal." State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227 (2004 ). "Issues about the district 
court's jurisdiction are issues of law, over which [Idaho appellate courts] exercise 
independent review." Id. 
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C. The District Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction Which Precluded It From 
Reformulating Mr. Villavicencio's Period Of Probation 
An I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence enables courts to address 
subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 839-840 (2011 ). "Subject 
matter jurisdiction has been defined as the power to hear and determine cases." 
Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227. "Absent a statute or rule extending its jurisdiction, the trial 
court's jurisdiction to amend or set aside a judgment expires once the judgment 
becomes final, either by expiration of the time for appeal or affirmance of the judgment 
on appeal." State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003). 
Subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental and parties to an action cannot waive 
subject matter jurisdiction. Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227. Moreover, "parties cannot 
consent to the court's assumption of jurisdiction through conduct or acquiescence nor 
be estopped from asserting its absence." Fairway Development Co. v. Bannock 
County, 119 Idaho 121, 125 (1990). "[S]ubject matter jurisdiction does not depend ... 
on the correctness of any decision made by the court." Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227. 
(citing 20 AM. JUR.2d Courts§ 70 (1995)). 
The district court's subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Villavicencio's case 
expired on March 6, 2013, approximately eight months before the State filed its motion 
to revoke probation. The relevant portion of I.C. 19-2601 (7) provides, "Under a 
conviction or plea of guilty for a felony the period of probation may be for a period of not 
more than the maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned." 
I.C. § 19-2601 (1 ); see also I.C. § 20-222(1) ("The period of probation or suspension of 
sentence shall be fixed by the court . . . . Such period . . . shall not exceed the 
maximum period for which the defendant might have been imprisoned."). 
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Mr. Villavicencio was convicted under I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (R., pp.25-26, 40), the 
relevant portions of which provides, "Any person who violates this subsection and has in 
his possession a controlled substance classified in schedule I ... is guilty of a felony 
and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than seven (7) years, or fined not 
more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or both." I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1) (emphasis 
added). Since the maximum sentence Mr. Villavicencio could receive for a violation of 
I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1 ), was seven years, the maximum period of probation the district 
court could impose in this matter was seven years. Moreover, this position was 
conceded by the State, the district court "placed [Mr. Villavicencio] on concurrent 
probations, each for a period of ten years." (Respondent's Brief, p.4 (citing R., pp.97-
103) (original emphasis).) "The sentence, as constructed by the district court, was 
therefore illegal and needed to be corrected." (Respondent's Brief, p.4.) 
The district court correctly granted Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct an illegal 
sentence and entered its Corrected Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation 
because district court's subject matter jurisdiction over this matter expired on March 6, 
2013. Support for Mr. Villavicencio's position can be found in State v. Kesling, 155 
Idaho 673 (Ct. App. 2013).3 In that case, Kesling was convicted for three offenses, to 
wit; forgery, grand theft by deception, and issuing a check without funds. Id. at 675. 
3 During the trial proceedings, Mr. Villavicencio cited to Kesling and argued that the 
district court lost subject matter jurisdiction over this case on March 6, 2013. 
(R., pp.238-242.) The district court also addressed the Kesling holding at the hearing 
on Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct an illegal sentence. (05/05/14 Tr., p.7, L.20 -
p.8, L.2.) In the Respondent's Brief, the State failed to address either Kesling or subject 
matter jurisdiction. (See generally Respondent's Brief.) As such, the State has waived 
any argument as to the Kesling holding or the district court's lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction. See Martin v. Smith, 154 Idaho 161, 164 (2013) ("An assignment of error is 
deemed waived, and will not be discussed if there is no argument contained in the 
appellant's brief."). Accordingly, this Court should not address any arguments the State 
may proffer in its Reply Brief as to either Kesling or subject matter jurisdiction. 
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The district court imposed three concurrent unified sentences of nine years, with two 
years fixed, but suspended the sentences and placed Kesling on three concurrent nine 
year periods of probation. Id. 
Through an interstate compact, Kesling transferred his probation to Florida. Id. 
Approximately five years after he was placed on probation, Kesling admitted to Florida 
authorities that he committed five new offenses. Id. These new offenses also served 
as the bases for probation violations in his Idaho cases. Id. After Mr. Kesling 
completed his sentences in Florida, he was transferred to Idaho to answer for his 
probation violations. Id. While in Idaho, Mr. Kesling filed an I.C.R. 35(a) motion and 
argued that his nine year sentence for issuing a check without sufficient funds was 
illegal because the maximum sentence the district court could impose for that offense 
was three years. Id. This motion was granted by the trial court. Id. Mr. Kesling also 
filed an I.C.R. 35(c) motion for credit for time served, which was denied by the district 
court. Id. Mr. Kesling appealed, to challenge the denial of his request for credit for time 
served. Id. 
For the first time on appeal, Kesling argued that the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over the issuing a check without sufficient funds offense because his 
probation for that offense expired before the State moved to revoke his probation. Id. at 
864. Specifically, he argued that the maximum period of probation that the trial court 
was statutorily authorized to impose was three years because the maximum sentence 
he could receive for that offense was three years. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed and 
held that the fact the district court ordered a nine year period of probation was 
immaterial because the maximum period of probation the district court was statutorily 
authorized was three years. Id. 865. Since the State moved the district court to revoke 
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probation approximately two years after Kesling's statutorily authorized period of 
probation expired, the Court of Appeals also held that, "the failure to commence 
proceedings within the imposed probation term deprives the court of subject matter 
jurisdiction." Id. The Court of Appeals then held: 
Id. 
Idaho statutes limit the term of probation that may be imposed by a court. 
Probation terms that exceed the statutory maximum violate the statutes. 
Therefore, the statutes do not confer jurisdiction for a court to take any 
action after the maximum authorized probation period. Accordingly, the 
district court here had no jurisdiction to revoke Kesling's probation in Ada 
County Case No. H0300379 because the maximum lawful period of 
probation had expired. Therefore, the order revoking probation and 
executing the sentence in that case must be reversed. 
This case is virtually indistinguishable from Kesling. In this case and in Kesling, 
the periods of probation ordered by the district courts exceeded the maximum periods of 
probation authorized under the respective statutes. In both cases, these errors were 
not noticed until the statutorily authorized periods of probation expired and the State 
moved to revoke probation after the statutorily authorized periods of probation expired. 
As such, Kesling is controlling authority and the district court correctly granted 
Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct an illegal sentence because the district court did not 
have jurisdiction to take any other action in this matter. 
As mentioned above, the State neither cites to Kesling nor addresses the 
jurisdictional argument advanced by Mr. Villavicencio before the district court. Instead, 
the State argues that Mr. Villavicencio agreed to a ten year period of probation when he 
entered a binding plea agreement and, since there was a way to legally order a ten year 
period of probation when the district court placed him on probation, the proper remedy 
is to remand this matter so the district court can implement the period of probation 
provided for in the plea agreement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.7-10.) The 
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State's position is fundamentally flawed because the district court no longer has subject 
matter jurisdiction over this case. As mentioned above, subject matter jurisdiction 
cannot be waived by parties in litigation. Rogers, 140 Idaho at 227. Moreover, "subject 
matter jurisdiction does not depend ... on the correctness of any decision made by the 
court." Id. It follows, that the district court's error when imposing a ten year period of 
probation in this case does not extend the district court's subject matter jurisdiction over 
a case. 
The State also argues that Mr. Villavicencio cannot benefit from a plea 
agreement and then disclaim aspects of the agreement which favor the State. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.7-8.) While that might be the general rule, it is not applicable in 
this case, because the district court lacked jurisdiction over this matter when the 
mistake was discovered. Support for this position can be found in State v. Armstrong, 
146 Idaho 372 (Ct. App. 2008). In that case, Armstrong was charged with lewd conduct 
with a minor under the age of sixteen and Armstrong pleaded guilty to a reduced charge 
of felony injury to a child. Id. at 373. As one of the terms of the plea agreement, the 
State agreed that it would not request a psychosexual evaluation. Id. Thereafter, 
Armstrong was placed on probation. Id. 
After a period of probation, Armstrong's probation officer requested that 
Armstrong participate in a psychosexual evaluation. Id. Armstrong refused to 
participate in a psychosexual evaluation and, due to that refusal, the State moved to 
revoke his probation. Id. Armstrong argued that this violated the plea agreement and 
requested either specific performance or, alternatively, that he be allowed to withdraw 
his guilty plea. Id. The State withdrew the probation violation and, in the event the 
district court found a breach of the plea agreement, it indicated that it would not object 
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to the withdrawal of Armstrong's guilty plea and the reinstatement of the lewd conduct 
charge. Id. The district court found that the State had not breached the plea 
agreement, "but that 'in fairness' Armstrong would be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea 
if he wished to do so." Id. Mr. Armstrong withdrew his guilty plea. Id. 
Another binding plea agreement was reached and Armstrong pleaded guilty to an 
amended charge of infamous crime against nature. Id. The agreement also included a 
unified sentence of six years, with one year fixed, and a four year period of probation, in 
the event Armstrong successfully completed a rider. Id. Armstrong successfully 
completed his rider and the district court placed him on a five year period of probation. 
Id. 
Armstrong timely appealed and argued that the five year period of probation 
violated his binding plea agreement. Id. On appeal, the State argued that the district 
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to allow Armstrong to withdraw his initial 
guilty plea to felony injury to a child. Id. The Court of Appeals agreed and held, based 
on State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003), that the district court did not have subject 
matter jurisdiction to allow Armstrong to withdraw his guilty plea because his judgment 
was final at the time he withdrew his guilty plea. Id. at 377-378. The Court of Appeals' 
holding follows: 
The Jakoski holding, that a trial court lacks subject matter 
jurisdiction to grant a motion for withdrawal of a guilty plea after the 
judgment of conviction becomes final, carries the attendant consequences 
discussed above, including the consequence that the validity of the order 
may be challenged at any time. In this case, it includes voiding all of the 
district court proceedings that followed in the months after the court 
granted Armstrong's untimely motion to withdraw his initial guilty plea 
because all of those proceedings occurred without subject matter 
jurisdiction. In view of the Supreme Court's explicit holding that subject 
matter jurisdiction is absent in this circumstance, if such consequences 
are not to attach, that clarification must come from our Supreme Court. 
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When Armstrong moved to withdraw his guilty plea to felony injury 
to children, the time for appeal from the judgment of conviction had 
expired and no appeal was pending. Therefore, under Jakoski, the district 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the motion. Accordingly, 
Armstrong's plea of guilty to felony injury to children and the judgment of 
conviction entered upon that guilty plea, including the sentence imposed, 
are reinstated. This disposition renders moot the issue raised by 
Armstrong in this appeal. 
Id. at 378. 
Armstrong is instructive in this matter because the State agreed that Armstrong 
could withdraw his guilty plea because the binding plea agreement was potentially 
breached when Armstrong's probation officer demanded that he participate in a 
psychosexual evaluation. In this case, the State functionally asserts that 
Mr. Villavicencio should be estopped from challenging the length of his probation 
because he agreed to a ten year period of probation. However, "[P]arties cannot 
consent to the court's assumption of jurisdiction through conduct or acquiescence nor 
be estopped from asserting its absence." Armstrong, 146 Idaho at 733 (citing Fairway 
Development Co, 119 Idaho at 125) (emphasis added). This principle is illustrated in 
Armstrong, as Armstrong negotiated a binding plea agreement which the State arguable 
breached when it required Armstrong to participate in a psychosexual evaluation. Even 
though the State received a benefit from the plea agreement and Armstrong lost one of 
his benefits from the plea agreement, he could not withdraw his guilty plea due to the 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In this case, the district court's error was discovered 
after the district court lost subject matter jurisdiction and, due to that procedural 
development, the district court cannot reformulate the period of probation it originally 
ordered. 
As a final note, the State was not without a remedy in this matter as it had seven 
years to discover this error and request an appropriate remedy. The State could have 
13 
corrected the perceived error at the rider review hearing. The State could have filed an 
appeal from the initial order placing Mr. Villavicencio on probation. The State had seven 
years to file an I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State is not 
entitled to the relief it has requested on appeal because it did not take any of these 
actions prior to the expiration of the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. 
In sum, the State concedes that the district court imposed a ten year period of 
probation when it was only statutorily authorized to impose a seven year period of 
probation. By omission, the State concedes this error was discovered after the 
statutorily authorized seven year period of probation expired. In Kesling, the Court of 
Appeals held that a trial court's subject matter jurisdiction also expires when the 
statutorily authorized period of probation expires, even if the trial court erroneously 
orders a period of probation which exceeds the statutorily authorized period of 
probation. As such, the district court lost jurisdiction over this matter on March 6, 2013, 
and the State has failed to provide any argument or authority which would extend the 
district court's jurisdiction past that date. Moreover, this was argued below and the 
State waived any argument as to this issue when it failed to address jurisdiction in the 
Appellant's Brief. However, the State now argues that the district court should be 
ordered to reformulate Mr. Villavicencio's period of probation in a manner consistent 
with the plea agreement. This course of action is not possible because the district court 
does not have jurisdiction over this matter. Since this is a jurisdictional issue, it is an 
absolute bar to the relief requested by the State. Accordingly, the district court did not 
err when it granted Mr. Villavicencio's motion to correct an illegal sentence and entered 
its Corrected Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Villavicencio respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
order granting his motion to correct an illegal sentence and the district court's Corrected 
Order Suspending Sentence and Order of Probation. 
DATED this 13th day of February, 2015. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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